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Summary  findings
In recent years foreign bank participation has increased  *  What draws foreign banks to a country?
tremendously in several developing countries. In  *  Which banks expand abroad?
Argentina, Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and  *  What do foreign banks do once they arrive?
Poland, for example, more than 50 percent of banking  * How does the mode of a bank's entry-for  example,
assets are now in foreign-controlled banks. In Asia,  as a branch of its parent or as an independent subsidiary
Africa, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union the  company-affect  its behavior?
rate of entry by foreign banks has been slower, but the  Clarke and his coauthors summarize current
trend is similar.  knowledge on these issues. In addition, since the existing
Although the number of countries welcoming foreign  literature focuses heavily on industrial countries, they put
banks is growing, many questions about foreign bank  forth an agenda for further study of the effects of foreign
entry are still being debated, including:  bank entry in developing countries.
This paper-a  product of the Office of the Senior Vice President, Development Economics-is  a background paper for
World Development Report 2002: Institutions for Markets. Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank,
1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Paulina Sintim-Aboagye,  room MC3-422, telephone 202-473 -
8526, fax 202-522-1155,  email address psintimaboagye@worldbank.org. Policy  Research Working Papers are also posted
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The authors may be contacted atgclarkeCaworldbank.org, rcull@worldbank.org,
mmartinezperia@worldbank.org,  or ssanchez@worldbank.org. October 2001. (41 pages)
The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series disseminates  the  findings  of  work  in  progress  to  encourage  the  exchange  of  ideas  about
development  issues.  An  objective  of  the series is to get  the findings  out quickly,  even  if the presentations  are less than  fully  polished.  The
papers  carry  the  names  of  the authors  and  should  be cited  accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations,  and  conclusions  expressed  in  this
paper  are entirely  those  of  the  authors.  They  do  not  necessarily  represent  the  view  of  the  World  Bank,  its  Executive  Directors,  or the
countries  they  represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterForeign Bank Entry: Experience, Implications for Developing Countries, and
Agenda for Further Research
George Clarke, Robert Cull, Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, and Susana M. Sanchez*
Keyword: foreign bank entry
JEL: G21
World  Bank staff  members  in DECRG,  DECRG,  DECRG,  and LCSFR,  respectively.  This  was prepared
as a background  paper for the World  Development  Report  2002:  Institutions  for Markets.  We thank  Gerard
Caprio and Andrew Powell for comments.  The World Bank Office of the Chief Economist  for Latin
America  also  provided  funding  for this paper.Foreign Bank Entry: Experience, Implications for Developing Countries, and
Agenda for Further Research
Introduction
Foreign bank entry refers to a process by which foreign  banks set up operations in
a host country mainly by either opening up a branch or  a subsidiary.  According to
Tschoegl (1985), the current degree of integration across banking sectors around the
world can only be compared to that existing at the eve of World War I.  Several countries
that allowed foreign bank entry in 1920 restricted it between 1920 and 1980. At the same
time, no country that forbade foreign entry in 1920 opened up over the same period.  In
recent years, the pendulum has swung back towards entry. The trend has been especially
pronounced in developing countries, although the pattern of entry has not been uniform
(Figure 1).  Latin America and the transition countries of Central Europe have been
quickest to permit  foreign participation in banking - in  Argentina, Chile, the  Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland, over fifty percent of total banking assets are in foreign-
controlled banks.  In  Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and  the Forner  Soviet Union,
progress has been much more modest.
This paper summarizes the existing literature on foreign entry, focusing on the
four main questions that researchers have attempted to address: (1) What draws foreign
banks to a country? (2) Which banks expand abroad? (3) What do foreign banks do once
they arrive?  and (4) How does mode of entry - for example, as a branch of its parent or
as an independent subsidiary company - affect behavior?  Answers to these questions
could help address concerns that foreign entry will weaken domestic banks, diminish the
ability of local regulatory and monetary authorities to influence bank behavior, unduly
expose the host country to economic shocks of the entrants' home countries, and imply
less credit for certain market  segments, such as small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), or at certain key times, such as during crises.
2Figure 1: Asset Share of Foreign Banks 1994, 1999
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Although  this paper  is mainly  concerned  with  the effect  of foreign  bank entry  on
developing  countries,  the  existing  literature  has  pnrmarily  focused  on  deve.oped
countries,  particularly  the  United  States.  It  is  important  to  keep  this  in  mind  when
assessing  the likely  effect  of foreign  bank  entry  on  sector  performance  and behav  or in
developing  countries.  For  example,  many  studies  have  found that  foreign  banks  in the
United  States are less  efficient  than  domestic  ones, perhaps  due to linguistic  and cultural
barriers  to business.'  However,  recent  cross-country  research  and  country  case  studies
suggest  that  the  opposite  is  true  for  developing  countries  - foreign  banks  appear  more
' See, for example,  DeYoung  and Nolle (1996),  Hasan  and Hunter  (1996),  Mahajan,  Ranjan,  and Zardkoohi
(1996),  Chang,  Hasan,  and Hunter (1998).
3efficient than  their  domestic  counterparts  in  these  countries. 2 If  policymakers in
developing countries primarily relied upon the literature on efficiency from industrialized
countries, they might therefore underestimate the potential benefits of foreign entry in
developing countries to the detriment of sector development. Therefore, a second goal of
this paper is to identify areas where knowledge about the effects of foreign bank entry in
developing countries is limited and to put forth an agenda for future research.
I. What Draws Foreign Banks? Location-Specific Factors
Empirical research on the factors that compel foreign banks to enter a country
indicate that the degree of economic integration between a foreign bank's home country
and the host  country which it  enters, the market opportunities available in  the host
country, and entry restrictions and other regulations (including tax treatment) have all
affected the pattern and timing of foreign entry. We discuss each factor in turn. Again,
much of that evidence comes from the United States, although in recent years  some
cross-country evidence has begun to emerge. 3
LA. Following Clients;  Home-Host Country Economic Integration
Multiple studies have found a positive and significant correlation between the
flow of bank foreign direct investment (FDI) and the extent of integration between home
and host countries. 4 A subset of those papers has examined the activities of foreign banks
2 Cross-country  evidence  is found  in  Demirguic-Kunt  and  Huizinga,  (2000). On Argentina  see Clarke  et al.,
(2000); Colombia, Barajas et al., (2000); Hungary, Kiraly et al., (2000); Greece and Portugal, Honohan
(2000); and Turkey, Denizer, (2000).
3  U.S.  states, however, do offer a unique laboratory for studying these issues, as they adopted different
approaches to foreign entry.  Foreign banks in the United States can employ various organizational forms,
have entered different geographic regions unevenly, have originated from different countries at different
rates, and have faced a  changing legal and economic environment.  These features provide sources of
variation that may provide information of more general applicability.
4 The extent of economic integration has been measured by geographical distance, volume of bilateral trade
flows, and/or volume of bilateral FDI. Ball and Tschoegl (1982) and Grosse and Goldberg (1991) include
geographical  distance between home and host countries as a measure of integration. Goldberg and Saunders
(1980) and  (1981), Goldberg and Johnson (1990), Grosse and Goldberg (1991), Brealey and  Kaplanis
(1996), and Yamori (1998) use bilateral trade flows, in addition to non-financial sector FDI, as a measure
4operating in the United States or the U.K. (hereafter, "from-many-to-one-host" studies). 5
Another subset has analyzed the foreign activities of banks from one country throughout
the world.  Those countries are the U.S., Japan, the U.K., and Germany (hereafter, "from-
one-to-many-hosts" studies). 6 In general, the studies that focus on the linkages between
economic integration and foreign bank entry are frequently taken to support the claim
that banks tend to follow their customers abroad.
However, on the basis of those studies, it is unclear whether FDI in  the non-
financial sector exerts a causal influence on the FDI of banks.  Causation might run 'n the
other direction, or more probably, some omitted factor or factors could be driving F'DI in
both sectors.  Most studies control for market size (as measured by GDP or population)
and foreign trade links between home and host countries.  Both market size and fcreign
trade are, as expected, positively linked to banking sector FDI, but those controls might
not be sufficient ones.  Omitted variables problems aside, a key limitation to this 1:ne  of
research is that the positive association between banking FDI and non-financial FDI does
not necessarily imply that foreign banks are providing financial services only, or even
principally, to the affiliates of clients from their home countries.  Co-location does not
necessarily imply a high level of interaction between banks and non-financial firms from
the same home country.
Seth,  Nolle,  and  Mohanty  (1998)  directly  address  this  shortcoming cf  the
literature.  Their study investigates the lending patterns of U.S.-based banks from .:apan,
Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the U.K., countries that account f:r  the
vast majority of  foreign bank  activity in the United  States. Also, they examine the
of economic integration. Finally, Nigh, Cho, and Krishnana (1986), Goldberg and Johnson (1990), Sagari
(1992), Brealey and Kaplanis (1996), Miller and Parkhe (1998), and Buch (2000) among others focus on
bilateral FDI flows.
5 Hultman and McGee (1989) and Budzeika (1991) examine the assets of foreign banks operating in the
U.S. in the  1970s and 80s.  Fisher and Molyneux  (1996) study the number of foreign banks  ar.d their
staffing levels in London from 1980-89.
6 On foreign assets of U.S. banks, see Miller and Parkhe (1998), Goldberg and Johnson (1990), Nigh, Cho,
and Krishnan (1986), and Sagari (1992).  On foreign assets of German Banks see Buch and Lapp (1998)
and Buch (2000).  On foreign assets of Japanese banks see Yamoni (1998).  Moshirian and Van der Laan
(1998) provide evidence for U.S., U.K., and German banks.  Theirs is the only study that fails to find a
strong link between non-banking sector FDI and foreign bank penetration.
5borrowing patterns of non-bank U.S. affiliates of firms from those countries.  They find
that banks from four of the six countries (Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, and the U.K.)
allocated a majority of their loans to non-home country borrowers for some or all of the
1981-92 period.  The authors conclude that the 'follow the customer' hypothesis might
have more limited applicability than previously speculated.
In many developing countries, that hypothesis might have even less applicability.
In a study of the activities of U.S. banks in 32 countries from 1987 to 1995, Miller and
Parkhe (1998) find that greater FDI to a host country is associated with foreign bank
entry, except for developing countries. 7 Additional research on the activities of foreign
banks in developing countries is clearly warranted. However, initial indications are that,
in  developing  countries,  foreign  entrants  face  relatively  less  effective  domestic
competition.  Developing  host  countries,  therefore,  might  offer  substantial  profit
opportunities in the provision of financial services. In that sense, foreign penetration in
banking might precede, and perhaps help bring about, entry of non financial-sector firms.
L.B. Opportunities in Host Country
A number of recent studies provide support for the notion that foreign banks are
attracted by profitable opportunities in host countries. Claessens, Demirgu9-Kunt, and
Huizinga (2000) model foreign presence across 80 countries from 1988-95, and find that
foreign banks are attracted to  markets with low taxes and a high per capita income.8
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) employ a richer set of variables to control for host market
profit opportunities. They model the location choices of 143 banks that had at least one
shareholding abroad  across  28  countries. 9 Because those  banks  come  from many
different countries, theirs is the most extensive "from-many-to-many" study to date.  In
addition to  controls for the degree of  economic integration between countries (non-
'  They note that the absence  of a relationship  between  FDI and entry for developing  countries  "can be
partly  traced  to retrenchment  by U.S.  banks  following  Latin  America's  debt  in the mid-1980s."  (p. 376)
8 Yamori  (1998)  also finds GDP per capita in host countries  to be a significant  determinant  of Japanese
banks' choice of location abroad. Brealey and Kaplanis (1996) and Buch (2000) find a positive relationship
between the presence of foreign banks and host country GDP.
6financial FDI, bilateral trade, and geographical distance) and regulatory restrictiors  on
bank entry, they include variables that measure the prospects for economic growth and
the competitiveness of the banking sectors of the potential host countries.
They find greater entry where the expected rate of economic growth is highe- and
the banking system is on average less efficient.  With respect to growth prospects.,  they
find that host-country initial GDP per capita and inflation are negatively associated.  with
foreign bank presence, while host-country stock  market capitalization has  a positive
relation.  There is substantial cross-country literature that finds that the signs onI  the
relations between those three factors - inflation, real per capita GDP, and stock market
development - and  economic growth are the same as those  found in  Focarelli and
Pozzolo (2000) for foreign bank presence. 10 For that reason, the authors interpret their
results to mean that foreign banks are more likely to enter host countries with better
prospects for growth.
With respect to the  efficiency of the host  country banking market, they find
greater foreign presence where local banks have higher average costs, lower net in:erest
margins less charge-offs, and higher cash flows (signaling an inefficient use of carlital).
They interpret these results as being consistent with the hypothesis that foreign investors
envision using their expertise and human capital in order to restructure inefficient banks.
They also find greater foreign presence where average bank size is smaller, which, they
speculate, is because it is easier to acquire such banks and there is greater opportunity to
increase market share after the restructuring.
Although  most  of  the  28  host  countries  in  the  Focarelli/Pozzolo study  are
developed, the study does include several developing countries, particularly the C.zech
Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Turkey, and South K.orea. Since domestic banks are
likely to be weakest in the developing countries, their results on the efficiency of the host
9 Their dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if bank i was present in countryj  in 1998.  There are
roughly 4000 bank-country observations  in their regressions.
10 See  Levine and  Zervos (1998)  and  Levine (1999)  for  a  summary  of  the  literature  on  financial
development  and growth. The negative relationship between the level of real GDP per capita and economic
growth rates is the so-called conditional convergence result.
7country banking market are another indication that foreign banks are more likely to enter
developing countries in order to exploit local profit opportunities.  Case study evidence
from Hungary, the transition country quickest to open up its banking sector, indicates  that
foreign banks in this country have become heavily involved in retail banking, both in
deposit taking and consumer lending, providing further support for this  hypothesis. 11
There is also some evidence that foreign competition has compelled some domestic banks
to seek new market niches.'2
The indications to  date are that foreign banks enter developing countries for
somewhat different reasons than they enter developed ones.  In particular, the 'follow the
customer' motivation seems less important for developing countries than for developed
ones,  which  suggests  that  foreign  banks  are  genuinely  interested  in  exploiting
opportunities in the host country.  Provided this does not leave some market segments,
such as small businesses, with less access to financial services, this type of entry should
bring substantial benefits to the host country.
More research on what motivates entry into developing countries is needed.  It is,
perhaps, unlikely that the Focarelli/Pozzolo results on local market opportunities would
fully apply to  the  most  underdeveloped countries, where  profitability prospects are
generally bleak.  Cultural connections might also affect the ability of entrants to take
advantage of local opportunities.  For example, Berger, Klapper, and Udell  (2000) find
that foreign-owned  banks headquartered in other South American nations are more likely
to lend to some classes of Argentine small businesses than foreign banks headquartered
in other countries, presumably  since similar culture  and language might  offer them
advantages over institutions from other places.
I. C. Host  Country  Regulation
The effects of host country regulations on foreign entry are straightforward - such
restrictions  limit  competition  and  protect  inefficient  domestic  banks.  Focarelli and
1 Bonin and Abel (2000).
12 fbid 11.
8Pozzolo (2000) find that foreign banks prefer to make investments in  countries with
fewer regulatory restrictions on banking activity. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b)
provide cross-country evidence that tighter restrictions on entry into banking (whether for
foreign or domestic banks) are associated with higher net interest margins and over.aead
costs.  In addition, the likelihood of a major banking crisis is positively associated with
limitations on foreign bank entry and ownership.' 3
Again, however, the most studied case is the United States, one that is highly
atypical.  As described by Goldberg (1992), before 1978 and the International Banking
Act,  regulatory restrictions on domestic and foreign banks were asymmetric, caL.sing
domestic banks to complain that foreign banks had unfair competitive advantages.  In
particular, foreign banks could establish offices across state lines, while domestic banks
were severely restricted. The International Banking Act limited the operations of foreign
banks across states, bringing their activities in line with  those of domestic banks. In
particular, new branches and agencies established by foreign banks outside their tome
states were only allowed to take the same type of deposits accepted by the Edge Act
Corporation, an institutional form also available to domestic banks.  However, foreign
banks were allowed to retain their existing interstate operations, established prior to the
effective date of the act. This resulted in an increase in foreign bank operations across
state lines before the legislation came into effect.'4
Although foreign entry restrictions  grew more homogenous as restrictions  on
cross-state banking activity were gradually lifted in the 1980s and '90s, individual state
regulations had substantial effects on the nature and pattern of foreign participation.' 5
Goldberg and Grosse (1994) provide econometric evidence that foreign banks had greater
presence in states with less strict regulations on foreign activities.  Hultman and McGee
(1989) note that many states implemented reciprocity provisions, asset maintenance or
13 Demirgiiu-Kunt,  Levine,  and  Min  (1999)  find  a  similar  result.  Barth  et  al.'s  (2001b)  measures  of
limitations  on foreign  entry  and  ownership,  and  of  more  general  entry  requirements  into  banking,  come
from a survey  of domestic  regulators  from  107 countries.
14  Goldberg  (1992), p.  167.
'5 See Kroszner  and Strahan  (1999)  for econometric  models  of the pattem  and timing  of expansion  of zross-
state banking  activity.
9deposit requirements, and geographic restrictions to exert some influence on foreign  bank
activities within,  their borders.  Furthermore, they argue that tax laws may also have had
some impact on foreign banks'  decisions regarding where to locate and what type of
office to establish.16 These papers conclude that few U.S. states pursued an open policy
that could be considered equivalent to a national treatment approach.
For developing countries, it will be interesting to contrast the experiences of those
that pursued open, 'level-playing-field' approaches to foreign participation, such as Chile
and Argentina, with others that have imposed special conditions on foreign banks such as
Egypt and South Korea.  Initial indications are that less open approaches have produced
meager benefits.  17
II. Which Banks Expand Abroad?
The characteristics of the banks that expand abroad might also provide some
indications about the nature of their participation in a destination market.  In  1988, for
example, banks from sixty different countries had some form of office in at least one U.S.
state. 18 At first glance, this rich variation in entrants, entry mode, and location choice
should  offer  evidence  about  the  ownership-specific factors  accountable  for  entry.
However, most theoretical explanations of how ownership-specific factors affect entry
revolve around a bank's degree of product differentiation or comparative advantage due
to superior skills.  Buch (2000) notes that, since it is difficult to obtain data that measure
this  sort of  comparative advantage, most  research on the  determinants of  entry has
focused on location-specific rather than ownership-specific factors.  Despite these data
limitations, there is  evidence indicating that bank size, efficiency, and home country
restrictions on banking are important determinants of which banks expand abroad.
16 As noted  above, cross-country evidence from  Claessens et al. (2000) indicate that high taxes deter
foreign entry.
17 See, for example, Hao, Hunter and Yang (2000) on the efficiency improvements associated with foreign
entry in Korea.
18 Damanpour (1990), p.128.  The ten most important countries, however, accounted for almost 90 percent
of the total assets of foreign banks in the U.S.
10Il.A.  Size
There are multiple reasons to  expect that large banks would be  more apt to
expand  abroad.' 9 In  the  first  place,  multinational enterprises are  expected  to  be
customers of larger banks and, therefore, it is more likely that these banks will be pulled
along to new locations, and thus offer some services abroad.  Second, banks with a large
home-market share might have stronger incentives than other banks to search for risk
diversification opportunities abroad.  Finally, increasing returns to scale in some clf the
banking services  that  are  characteristic of  international banking, such  as  portfolio
management and investment banking, could favor large banks.
Several papers have found a positive correlation between the size of banks and
their degree of internationalization. Tschoegel (1983) studies the activities of the wcrld's
100 largest international banks as of 1976 and finds that larger banks exhibit a greater
presence worldwide. Grosse and Goldberg (1991) use data on the average characterstics
of the home country banking sector to provide indirect evidence on the importance of
size. They find that sector size was positively linked to foreign bank presence in the U.S.
from  1980 to  1988. Studying the activities of Japanese banks in Korea, Ursacki and
Vertinsky (1992) find a positive relationship between a bank's asset size and the nuniber
of branches. Williams (1996) and (1998) obtain similar findings for the case of fcoeign
banks in Australia. In their recent study of the activities of foreign banks in 28 C)ECD
countries, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) also find direct evidence that a bank's  si:ze, as
measured by total assets, is positively correlated with its degree of internationalization.
II.B. Efficiency
There are two types of evidence on efficiency, one comparing the efficiency of
foreign entrants with domestic competitors, the other showing that, within the subset of
banks that  expand abroad, those with  the  highest degree of  internationalizatior  are
relatively more efficient.  With respect to efficiency comparisons, several studies have
'  This  discussion  draws from  Focarelli  and  Pozzolo  (2000).
11found that foreign-owned banks are, on average, less efficient than the domestic banks in
developed host nations.  Hasan and Hunter (1996), for example, find that Japanese
multinational banks in the U.S. are, on average, less efficient than U.S. multinational
banks. 21 However, some studies, in particular those that have not used the U.S. as the
host nation in the analysis, have found that foreign institutions have nearly the same
average efficiency as domestic institutions (Vander Vennet (1996), Hasan and Lozano-
Vivas (1998)).22
Efficiency  comparisons between  foreign  and  domestic  banks  in  developing
countries yield very different results.  Claessens, Demirgiiu-Kunt, and Huizinga (2000)
find that foreign banks have lower interest margins, overhead expenses, and profitability
than domestic banks in developed countries, while the opposite is true in developing
countries.  They interpret their results to imply that the reasons for foreign entry, as well
as the competitive and regulatory conditions found abroad, differ significantly between
developed and developing countries.
What case study evidence there is from developing countries also indicates that
foreign entrants are relatively more efficient than domestic competitors. Barajas, Steiner,
and Salazar (2000) compare the performance of foreign owned versus domestic banks in
Colombia from 1985 to 1998. They find that foreign owned banks, regardless of whether
they were originally owned by nationals or not, have fewer non-performing loans, lower
reserve requirements, and  are  more productive.  Clarke  et  al.  (2000)  find  similar
performance advantages for foreign banks  operating in  Argentina in  the  late  1990s.
Bhattacharya, Lovell, and Sahay (1997) find that foreign banks are slightly more efficient
than domestic ones in India.
20  See,  for example, DeYoung  and  Nolle  (1996),  Hasan  and  Hunter  (1996),  Mahajan, Ranjan,  and
Zardkoohi (1996), Chang, Hasan, and Hunter (1998), Miller and Parkhe (1999), Parkhe and Miller (1999),
Berger, De Young, Genay, and Udell (2000).
21 Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2000) speculate that this disadvantage may stem from language, cultural, or
supervisory/regulatory  structures in the home countries of the foreign banks.
22 Vander Vennet (1996) focuses on European host countries; Hasan and Lozano-Vivas  (1998) on Spain.
12The  second type of  evidence, which models foreign entry as  a  function of
efficiency (and other factors), comes again from Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000). The, find
that a bank's return on assets is positively correlated with the degree to which it expands
abroad.  They also find that banks with a higher share of non-interest income are nore
likely to have a foreign presence. Their interpretation is that more innovative banks look
for new profit opportunities and, therefore, have both a larger share of revenues from
non-traditional activities and a  greater propensity to  expand abroad.  For developing
countries, such entrants would appear to bring many benefits, depending on the services
they choose to provide.
Size and efficiency are important determinants of which banks go abroad, but
other, less studied factors also appear to play a role.  For example, Calderon and Cz.silda
(1999) review the process of foreign bank entry into Latin Arnerica over the last dezade.
They argue that  the deregulation of the  financial system in Spain, together with  the
increase in competition brought about by the EMU, led Spanish banks to invest heavily in
Latin America in an aggressive attempt to expand their regional presence.  They have
tried to obtain a strong participation in comrmercial  banking, while at the same time
attempting to diversify and look for other business opportunities like investment banking,
insurance, and pension funds. 23 In examining the activities of foreign banks in the U.S.,
Goldberg (1992) notes that foreigners were able to penetrate American banking in the
1980s because of greater funds availability. Over this period, many foreign countries like
Japan had higher savings rates and trade surpluses than the United States and were trying
to  find places to  invest. In summary, studies  like Calderon and  Casilda (1999i  and
Golberg (1992) suggest that there are other home country factors aside from siZ2e  and
efficiency that can push banks into expanding abroad.
23 The authors  argue that foreign entry (in particular  by Spanish  banks) has increased  competition  and
brought greater stability to the local financial systems. However, foreign entry has also resulted in an
increase in bank concentration, and, while operating costs have fallen, the cost of credit for bank clients has
not dropped significantly.
13II. C. Home Country  Regulation
Home country regulations can affect the pattern and nature of foreign bank entry.
These include restrictions on outward investment and more general regulations on bank
behavior that have implications for the nature of competition that a bank can offer in a
destination country.  For example, Frankel and Morgan (1992) find that differences in
cross-country regulatory requirements may have reduced foreign banks'  costs relative to
U.S. banks, thus enhancing their competitiveness.
In regressions that explain foreign presence, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) include
as explanatory variables both home-country restrictions on banks' outward foreign direct
investment and restrictions on domestic banking activities.  They find that restrictions on
outward foreign direct investment reduce the likelihood that local banks will enter other
countries.  Somewhat more surprisingly, they find that restrictions on domestic banks'
activities lower  the  probability that  those  banks will  enter  foreign markets.  They
speculate that the restrictions reduce the efficiency of the banking sector, and, as a result,
banks from such countries are less likely to have a comparative advantage with respect to
the competitors in their destination market. 24
lII. What Do Foreign Banks Do?
The aforementioned evidence indicates that foreign banks do not merely follow
existing customers from their home countries abroad, but also they are attracted by host-
country opportunities.  In developing countries, it appears that foreign banks are even
more apt to pursue local profit opportunities. But what form does that local participation
actually take?  In this section, we review the literature in three areas.  First, we discuss
the nature of competition with domestic banks.  Next, we discuss the implications of
foreign entry for stability. In addition to concerns that foreign banks will drive domestic
ones out of business, there are stability concerns related to credit crunches.  In times of
14crisis, foreign banks may curtail their lending to the host country, further exacerbating
existing problems.  Finally, there is concern that foreign banks will 'cherry pick' the best
available borrowers, while neglecting market  segments like  small and medium-*,ized
enterprises.  If cherry picking weakens domestic banks sufficiently that some must exit
the market, the overall supply of finance to SMEs may decline.
Il.A.  Competition  with Domestic  Banks
Several studies  have  examined the  activities of  foreign banks  in  devel)ped
countnes,  particularly  the  U.S.  For  example,  Goldberg  (1981)  finds  that  U.S.
multinational banks tend to  serve retail customer bases, whereas  foreign institutions
operating in the U.S. are oriented more towards wholesale business. Damanpour (1990)
provides similar evidence by showing that foreign banks exhibit a heavy concentration of
commercial and industrial loans in their portfolios.  Calomiris and Carey (1994) suggest
that the growth of foreign banks'  market share depended more on purchasing exi,ting
loans  rather than  originating new  loans.  Similarly, Kraus (1995) finds  that,  having
established a presence in the United States, many foreign banks increased their miarket
share by acquiring existing U.S. banks, rather than by originating  new loans.
Although their wholesale orientation limited the scope of the benefits that foreign
banks could provide, some borrowers were made better off.  Goldberg (1992) notes that
foreign banks  that  were  new  entrants were  often accused of  pricing  their proclucts
(particularly commercial and industrial loans) below domestic competitors in ord.:  r to
obtain business.  They were able to accept smaller profit margins than their donmestic
competitors because of lower capital requirements and a greater ability to use leverage. 25
The high cost of doing business in a foreign country means that foreign banks will
often find themselves at a competitive disadvantage, which they need to overcome either
24  Barth,  Caprio.  and  Levine  (2001  a,b)  provide  cross-country  evidence  that  restricting  the  ranrJe  of
domestic  banks'  activities  is negatively  associated  with bank performance  and stability.
Zimmer  and McCauley  (1991)  conclude  that foreign  banks  enjoyed  cost  of capital advantages  over U.S.-
owned  banks.  McCauley  and  Seth  (1992)  and  Terrell  (1993)  find  similar  advantages  for  foreign  banks
concerning  cost of funds.
15through special  expertise or  services.  In the U.S., a  developed country with  strong
domestic banks, it is hard to do this and, therefore, it is not surprising that foreign banks
competed largely on price and in the wholesale market.  In such environments, the only
niche expertise that many foreign banks can offer is their knowledge of and links to their
home country.
The U.S. is not, however, a typical host country. Using an 80-country sample of
both  developed  and  developing  countries, Claessens, Demirgui,-Kunt, and  Huizinga
(2000) estimate how foreign bank entry, measured as the change in the percentage of
banks operating in  a  host country that  are foreign-owned, affects the  operations of
domestic banks.  They find that foreign banks reduce the profitability of domestic banks,
and there is some evidence that the non-interest income and overall expenses of domestic
banks are also negatively affected by foreign entry.  The authors interpret the results to
mean that foreign bank entry leads to greater efficiency in the domestic banking system.
In developing countries, local banks will likely find it harder to  protect their
profits.  Using panel estimation techniques, Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar (2000) provide
evidence on the competitive impact of foreign entry in Colombia.  In regressions where
foreign entry serves  as  the  sole  measure  of  financial sector  liberalization, entry is
associated with lower intermediation spreads, reduced non-financial costs, and improved
loan quality  (fewer  non-performing loans  relative  to  total  loans).  In  simple  OLS
regressions, they find that new banks, whether domestic or foreign, were setting lower
spreads than their established counterparts, presumably in an effort to gain market share.
In  Colombia, foreign  entry  occurred concurrently with  other  structural and
regulatory changes.  When the authors include measures of domestic bank entry and a
measure of non-entry-related financial liberalization, the impact of foreign entry changes
slightly. Both domestic and foreign entry were associated with significant reductions in
non-financial costs for all banks, and with significant increases in non-performing loans
for existing domestic banks.  They find, however, that foreign entry was associated with
lower spreads among foreign banks, while domestic entry lowered spreads across all
16banks.  This last result suggests that foreign banks in Colombia did not compete against
domestic ones in all sectors, but rather in a subset of areas.
Similarly, for the case of Argentina in the late 1990s,  Clarke et al. (2000) find that
although foreign banks competed beyond the wholesale market, they did not con pete
with  domestic  banks  in  all  sectors  equally.  These results  are consistent with  the
hypothesis  that  foreign  banks  enter  specific  areas where  they have  a  comparative
advantage putting pressure on the domestic banks already focusing on those types of
lending.  In  particular,  the  authors  find  that  domestic  banks  with  loan portfolios
concentrated in manufacturing, an area where foreign banks traditionally devoted a large
part of their lending, tended to  have lower net margins and lower profits than cther
domestic banks. On the other hand, banks primarily involved in consumer lending:,  an
area where foreign banks have not been heavily involved had higher net interest margins
and higher profits.  For developing countries, this is an area in need of much additional
empirical work.  The initial indications are that foreign entry does exert competitive
pressure on all domestic banks, but the pressures exerted are in specific lines of business,
and those lines may vary from country to country.
III.B. Implications  for  Stability
By permitting foreign banks to enter, host countries open themselves up tn the
possibility that economic fluctuations in the home countries of their entrants might have
an impact on foreign lending, and thus on their general level of economic activity.  ?eek
and Rosengren (2000a)  find that the collapse of the Japanese equity and  real estate
markets and the subsequent banking crisis in Japan had an impact on the fall in econo)mic
activity witnessed in the commercial real estate sector in the United States in the 1990s.
Japanese bank subsidiaries in the U.S. responded to the problems in Japan by reducing
lending in the U.S..  Given that Japanese banks had a very significant presence in some of
the  major  commercial real  estate markets  in  the  U.S.,  this  decline  in  lending  had
important real effects on construction activity.
Evidence that host countries can be affected by cyclical conditions in the hFome
countries of foreign banks can also be found for the case of U.S. banks operating abroad.
17Using bank-specific data on U.S. bank claims on individual foreign countries since the
mid-1980s, Goldberg (2001) concludes that foreign claims are highly correlated with
U.S. GDP growth, but not with foreign demand conditions.
On the other hand, when a host country's economy is stagnant or in crisis, foreign
banks with internationally diversified asset portfolios may be a stabilizing influence. For
example,  Goldberg  (2001)  finds  that  U.S.  banks  did  not  retrench  their  lending
significantly following periods of crises.  Cross-country evidence in Demirgiiu-Kunt,
Levine, and Min (1998) and Levine (1999) indicates that, controlling for other factors
that are likely to produce banking crises, foreign bank presence reduces their likelihood.
Moreover, as described above, Barth et al. (2000) find that restrictions on foreign entry
are associated with lower loan portfolio quality, on average, and greater sector fragility.
In summary, the cross-country evidence indicates that, on average, foreign entry
has provided net benefits in terms of stability. In individual country cases, the outcome
might depend on the roster of entrants.  Too much exposure to banks from any single
country may  increase instability, especially if  that  country's  economy is  subject to
fluctuations, and the entrants do not hold diversified portfolios of assets.  For example,
there  is concern that  Latin  American banking  sectors are too  exposed to  economic
fluctuations in Spain.  Since the mid-90s Banco Santander Central Hispano (BSCH) and
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) have  spent about $13 billion  to purchase
control of 30 major banks in Latin America.  Those banks comprise $US 126 billion in
assets - almost 10 percent of the region's  banking assets or 7.5 percent of regional
GDP.
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More research on the implications of this exposure is clearly needed.  However,
the evidence emerging from Argentina suggests that potential problems might not be too
severe.  While  exposure to  Spain  has  grown substantially, so too  has  Argentina's
exposure to banks from other countries (Figure 2).  In  1993, foreign-controlled banks
from eleven countries held 18 percent of total banking sector assets; by 1999, banks from
26 I1D (2000).
18fifteen countries held over 50 percent.  U.S. banks had the largest presence with a 7
percenit  asset share in 1993 and a 16  percent share in 1999. While Spanish banks did hold
a  hefty  14 percent  market  share  by  1999, the  diversified  pattern  of foreign  ownership
should afford Argentina some protection, provided, of course, that economic fluctua:ions
across home countries  are not too highly correlated.
Figure 2: Bank Ownership  in Argentina
1993 Quarter  2
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.Source: authors  calculations  based  on data from the Central Bank of Argentina
1  9In  fact, there is  some evidence that this  diversified roster of  entrants was a
stabilizing force in Argentina in the 1990s. Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000) provide
evidence that foreign banks had higher loan growth rates than domestic private or state-
owned banks  throughout the period, and that  foreign bank  credit grew during crisis
periods.  However, crises during this period did not emanate from the developed home
countries of  the  foreign entrants, but  rather  from  other developing countries.  It  is
encouraging that foreign banks did not suddenly withdraw from these markets, but, had
the crisis emanated from  Spain, for example, the average response might have been
different.  Moreover,  given the  extensive  Spanish presence  throughout the  region,
economic problems in one Latin American country may increasingly be transmitted to
others through these banks.  For developing countries, empirical work similar to Peek and
Rosengren (2000a) and Goldberg (2001) on the role of foreign banks around the world as
transmission mechanisms for shocks is clearly warranted.
II. C. Type of Lending  (SMEs)
In  general,  foreign banks  appear to  allocate greater  shares of  their  lending
portfolios to commercial and industrial loans, providing indirect evidence that foreign
banks may be more important in the market for loans to  large companies.  Goldberg
(1992) notes that foreign banks operating in the U.S. held 28.5% of all commercial and
industrial loans, but only 22.6 % of all banking assets. 27 In a survey of 271 foreign banks
operating in the U.S., Cho, Krishnan, and Nigh (1987) find that 56% pointed to trade
finance as a major area of specialization; 44% mentioned corporate banking; and 31%
listed foreign exchange trading, all services that are likely to benefit disproportionately
large businesses.  Similarly, for Argentina, Clarke et al. (2000) find that, in the late
1990s, foreign banks devoted about 35% of their loan portfolios to manufacturing, while
private domestic banks devoted less than 20% to that sector, and public domestic banks
devoted only 10%.
27 As reported in the American Banker, February 27, 1990,  p.  18A.
20In  interpreting  portfolio  comparisons,  Peek,  Rosengren,  and  Kasirye  (1999)
caution  that  foreign  banks  tend  to buy  domestic  banks  that  already  have  perfornance
problems  and  so  may  be reducing  credit  for  other  reasons.  This retrenching  mnay have
some short-term  impact  on lending  decisions,  especially  with respect to small businesses,
but it is unlikely  to  explain  fully  the  large,  persistent  disparities  in portfolio  orinntation
between  foreign  banks and domestic  banks.  Those disparities  appear to be as pronounced
in developing  countries  as they are in developed  ones.
As  indicated  by Focarelli  and  Pozzolo  (2000),  most  banks  with  an inter-ational
presence  tend  to be large.  Large  banks  may  be impeded  by organizational  diseccinomies
in providing  relationship  lending  services  to  small businesses  at the same time  tllat they
are providing  transactions  lending  services and wholesale  capital  market  services to their
large  clients.28 To the extent  that they  lend  to small borrowers,  large  banks  are likely to
employ  standardized  methods  for  assessing  creditworthiness  based  on readily  available
information.  For smaller  banks,  it may  pay  to grant  loan  officers  greater  latitucl- to use
idiosyncratic  borrower  information,  most of which  is not easily quantified  of transferable,
in assessing  creditworthiness.29  This  flexibility  makes  it easier  to create  and  m2intain  a
relationship  between  small banks and small borrowers.
There  is  substantial  evidence  from  the  United  States  that  indicates  that  large,
though  not necessarily  foreign, banks  lend less of their portfolios  to small businesses  than
do  smaller  banks  (Berger,  Kashyap,  and  Scalise  (1995);  Keeton  (1995);  Levoniian and
Soller (1995); Berger  and Udell (1996);  Peek and Rosengren  (1996); Strahan  and Weston
(1996)) .30  Nine percent  of the assets  of small  U.S.  banks  (those  with  assets belcow $100
million)  are devoted  to domestic  commercial  and  industrial  loans to borrowers  w th bank
28  Berger,  Klapper,  and Udell  (2000).
29 Cole,  Goldberg,  and White  (1999)  find that  large  banks are more  likely  to base their  small  busmness  loan
approvals  on financial  ratios,  whereas  small  banks  are more likely  to base their decisions  on the existence
of a prior relationship  with  the borrower.
30 Strahan  and Weston  (1996) find that there is a non-linear  relationship  between  small  business  lending
and bank size. As banks  grow, small  business  lending  increases  rapidly  at first,  leading  to an increase  in
the ratio of small  business  loans  to assets.  However,  as banks  get larger  and they are able to lenJ to large
businesses,  this type  of lending  takes  off and the share  (but  not the level)  of lending  to SMEs  drops.
21credit less than $1 million. For large banks (those with assets over $5 billion), that figure
is only three percent. 31
A key policy concern is that, if foreign competition forces some small domestic
banks to exit the market, the supply of credit to informationally opaque small businesses
will decline.  Direct evidence on small business lending in Latin America is somewhat
mixed. Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2000) find that small businesses in Argentina are less
likely than larger ones to receive any credit from large banks or from foreign banks. 32
Also analyzing the case of Argentina, Escude et al. (2001) find that while foreign banks
allocated a smaller share of their lending portfolio to SMEs relative to domestic banks,
they granted almost half of the total credit to this sector in the year 2000. They argue that
this is evidence that foreign banks do not discriminate against SMEs.
Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria, and  Sanchez (2001) find  that foreign banks  in
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru generally lent a smaller fraction of their funds to
SMEs than similar domestic banks in the late  1990s.  However, they find that other
factors might have mitigated this.  First, they find that differences between foreign and
domestic banks were far less pronounced for large banks than they were for small banks
in all four countries.  In fact, in two of the four countries, Chile and Colombia, their
econometric analysis suggests that large foreign banks might actually have lent relatively
more to SMEs than large domestic banks after controlling for other factors that affect
lending to SMEs.  Further, they find that the growth rate of real lending to SMEs was
higher for foreign banks than for domestic banks in Peru, and was also higher for large
foreign banks than large domestic banks in Argentina and Chile.
31 Figures are from the June Reports of Income and Condition, 1996, as reported in Strahan and Weston
(1998).  Loans to small business are commercial and  industrial loans with  original amount under $1
mnillion.
32 Due to data limitations, they measure size of borrowing funs  based on their total debt within the system
rather than on assets.  They also run separate Logit models for the probability of receiving a loan from a
large bank and the probability of receiving a loan from a foreign bank.  This makes it harder to assess
whether it is bank size or foreign ownership that limits access for small borrowers.  Controlling for bank
size, foreignness  may not be that important a determinant of access.
22The evidence regarding increased lending to SMEs by large foreign banks found
in  Clarke, Cull, Martinez  Peria, and  Sanchez (2001) might be  explained by  recent
changes  in  technology.  Mester  (1997)  argues  that  advances  in  credit  scoring
methodologies coupled with enhanced computer power and increased data availability
might change the nature of small business lending.  These factors could make it less
necessary for a bank to have a physical presence in all geographic areas in which it lends
(Petersen and Rajan, 2000) and could help large foreign banks to overcome some of the
diseconomies and difficulties in lending to small borrowers.
However, even if  foreign banks continue to  primarily focus on  serving large
customers, foreign entry might still benefit small borrowers. First, competition for large
customers could displace some domestic banks, forcing them to seek new market niches
such as providing credit to SMEs.  Consistent with this, Bonin and Abel (2000) find that
as foreign penetration increased in Hungary some smaller domestic banks sought new
market areas.  Similarly, in a survey of banks from 78 countries, Jenkins (2000) finds
that, 44 percent of those banks that lent to  small and micro enterprises indicated that
changed market conditions and increased competition in lending to large and medium-
sized enterprises were the two most important reasons for doing so. 33
As illustrated in the discussion above, studies that have focused on foreign versus
domestic individual bank behavior (using primarily individual bank balance sheet data)
have not provided a definitive answer on the net effect of foreign entry on access to credit
for small and medium-sized enterprises. Isolating the effect of foreign entry on domestic
banks'  lending from macroeconomic changes can be  difficult in country case studies,
especially since relatively few commercial banks operate in many developing countries. 34
33 Given the available  data, which  did not include detailed  information  on cross-regional  differences  in
lending,  Clarke,  Cull, Martinez  Peria, and Sanchez  (2001) could not test for competitive  displacement
effects in the four Latin American countries included in their study.
34 This is true even in many mniddle-income  countries.  For example, in the late 1990s, there were anly 28
commercial banks in Colombia, 19 commercial banks  in Peru, 28  commercial banks in Chile, and 91
commercial banks in Argentina (Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Sanchez, 2001).
23However, comparable cross-country data on lending to SMEs is not  easily available,
especially since small local banks tend to be important in this area of lending. 35
Rather than relying upon information from bank balance sheets, Clarke, Cull, and
Martinez Peria (2001) use  a  survey of  over 4,000 enterprises in  38  developing and
transition economies, to study whether borrowers' perceptions regarding interest rates
and  access to  long-term credit  are positively associated with the presence of foreign
banks.  If the potential advantages of foreign entry - improved sector efficiency, a subset
of domestic banks forced by competitive pressures into new market niches, and new
credit scoring technologies - outweigh the general tendency of large foreign banks to
eschew SME lending, borrowers should rate access to credit (both quantities and terms)
as easier in countries with relatively high levels of foreign bank penetration.  Overall,
their  empirical results  strongly  support the  assertion that  foreign bank  penetration
improves firms'  access to credit.  Enterprises in countries with high  levels of foreign
bank penetration tended to  rate interest rates and access to  long-term loans as lesser
constraints on enterprise operations and growth than enterprises in countries with less
foreign penetration.  Further, the benefits of high levels of foreign bank penetration do
not appear to  accrue only to large enterprises.  Although some evidence suggests that
entry by foreign banks benefits large enterprises more than small enterprises, there is
strong evidence that even small enterprises gain in some ways and there is no evidence
that they are harmed by foreign entry.
The recent evidence on the impact of foreign bank entry on lending to SMEs
suggests that this process might not severely diminish access to credit by this type of
borrower, as first suspected. However, the number of empirical studies on this subject is
35 We are not aware of any sources that provide detailed data on total lending to SMEs that is comparable
across countries.  One reason  why this  is difficult  is that regulators in different  countries often have
different reporting requirements and definitions for loans to SMEs.  For example, in the four country case
studies from Latin America in Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Sanchez (2001), two of the regulators
collected data based upon loan size (Argentina and Peru), one required banks to keep separate records of
loans to small businesses (Colombia), and one collected data based upon the total debt of the business
(Chile).
24still too small and covers only a limited number of countries and periods.  Clearly, rriore
research on this topic is needed.
IV. How Do Mode of Entry and Organizational Form Affect Foreign Bank Activity?
In some instances, host countries provide incentives for foreign banks to adopt
specific modes of entry and specific organizational forms.  For example, since the 1  970s
Egypt permitted foreign entry only through joint  ventures with the state, although in
recent  years  the government has  begun  divesting itself  of those  shares. 36 In  other
instances, governments limit the number of banking licenses thus making entry possible
only by acquiring the license of an existing domestic bank, either through purchase or
merger.  In still other cases, as in Argentina, there do not appear to be strong incentives
toward particular organizational forms or modes of entry, and yet not all foreign banks
make the same choice. 37 This section of the paper discusses some potential implications
of two modes of entry (de  novo  versus the acquisition of, or merger with, a dorr.estic
bank) and three organizational forms (as a branch, subsidiary, or representative agent of
the parent bank).  The section closes by discussing the impact of foreign bank penetration
through cross-border lending.
IV.A. Merger and Acquisition
Berger, De Young, Genay, and Udell  (2000) summarize several hundred papers
on the causes and consequences of consolidation, and thus we need not duplicatt- that
effort here.  Most of that literature focuses again on developed countries, particularly the
United States and the EU, and most examines mergers and acquisitions between doraestic
banks.  They note that the scale, scope, and product mix efficiencies literatures provide
very little information on the effects of cross-border consolidation, which may differ
36 Caprio and Cull (2000).
37  In  Argentina both branches and  subsidiaries are  required to  have their  own  capital and  meet  the
Argentine capital requirements.
25from the scale, scope, and mix effects within a single nation.  Moreover, the within-
country literature generally finds that scale and scope have small efficiency effects.
They also perform an empirical analysis of cross-border banking efficiency in
France, Germany, Spain, the U.K.,  and the U.S.  during the  1990s.  They find that
domestic banks in these countries have both higher cost efficiency and profit efficiency
than foreign banks, although these differences are not always statistically significant. A
priori,  these findings can be  interpreted as  supporting the home field advantage of
domestic banks.  However, when they disaggregate their results by nation of origin, they
find  that  domestic  banks are  more efficient  than foreign banks  from  most  foreign
countries; are equally efficient with  foreign banks from some  countries; and are less
efficient than foreign banks from one country, the U.S.
Because foreign banks are less efficient on  average than domestic banks, the
authors argue that efficiency considerations may limit the global consolidation of the
financial services industry.  However, they also note that if banks from some countries,
particularly the U.S.,  are better able to operate across borders than others, they may
capture disproportionate shares of the international financial services business in  the
future.  What might this imply for developing countries?  If weak domestic institutions
are being  purchased by,  or merged with,  efficient  foreign entrants  from  developed
countries, this should bring benefits to the host country.  It remains an open question
whether these are the types of mergers that will take place, but there appear to be  a
number of opportunities to improve banking efficiency in developing countries that are
not available in many developed countries.  Phrased another way, we might expect much
of  the future cross-border consolidation in  financial services to  occur in  developing
countries, precisely because their domestic banks are relatively inefficient.
Most of the research on scale economies in developed countries  comes from the
1980s, and Berger, De Young, Genay, and Udell  (2000) point out that  more recent
technological changes  may  have  increased  scale  economies  in  producing  financial
services.  They note that  economies of  scale may be  greater for  some new  service
delivery  methods  such  as  internet  banking,  phone  centers,  and  ATMs  (Radecki,
26Wenninger, and Orlow, 1997).  In addition, advances in payments technology appeal to
have created scale economies in back-office operations and network economies that  -,an
be  more  readily  exploited by  large banks  (Bauer and  Hancock (1993);  Bauer  and
Hancock (1995); Bauer and Ferrier (1996); Hancock, Humphrey, and Wilcox (1999)).
In line with these predictions, using data from the  1990s, Berger and Meiter
(1997) find that there may be  substantial scale economies, even for mergers between
large banks, presumably due at least in part to technological progress.  Foreign entry in
developing countries is likely to coincide with broader consolidation within the host-
country banking sector, and at least some of it will involve large banks.  If the scale
economies associated with that consolidation bring about more electronic banking, this
could improve access to  some types  of financial services even for small custonmers.
Moreover, Berger, De Young, Genay, and Udell (2000) note that the technologies that
yield scale economies may increasingly be  accessed at low cost by small institutions
"through franchising or outsourcing to firms specializing in the technologies or through
shared access to networks." 38
With or without these technological improvements:,  one might still be conceTned
about the effect of foreign entry through mergers and acquisitions on the supply of credit
to domestic businesses, especially small ones that rely heavily on bank credit for external
finance. 39 As noted above, a number of empirical papers have demonstrated that, ir  the
U.S., larger banks devote a lower proportion of their total credit to small firms thanl  do
small banks. The merger or takeover of small domestic banks in a developing country by
larger foreign entrants, therefore, might imply a reduction in credit to small firms.
As  with  efficiency effects, the implications of  cross-border consolidation for
lending to  small businesses  will  almost certainly depend  on  who  merges with  (or
acquires) whom.  Studies usually have found that mergers and acquisitions involving
large  banking  organizations reduced  small  business  lending  substantially, although
3  P. 12.
39 For example, Cole et  al. (1996) find that commercial banks are the most important source of credit to
small U.S. firms using data from the National Survey of Small Business Finance.
27mergers and acquisitions between small organizations were often found to increase small
business lending (Keeton (1996), (1997); Peek and Rosengren (1996), (1998); Strahan
and Weston (1996), (1998); Craig and Santos (1997); Kolari and Zardkoohi (1997 a, b);
Zardkoohi and Kolari (1997); Walraven (1997); Berger et al. (1998); Avery and Samolyk
(2000); Bonaccorsi, di Patti, and Gobbi (2000)).
The literature also indicates that consolidation  may have a strong 'external effect'.
Banks that are not in the process of consolidating may respond to a decline in some types
of credit by larger, consolidating institutions by increasing their own supplies of credit. In
particular, for  the U.S.,  Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and  Udell (1998) and Avery and
Samolyk (2000) find that almost all the decline in lending to small businesses by the
merger and acquisitions participants was offset by increased lending to this sector by
other incumbent banks in the same local markets. Berger et al. (2001) note, however, that
even if the external effect completely offsets the effects of consolidation in terms of the
quantities of relationship credit supplied, some of the firms  would likely have to undergo
search  and  disruption  costs,  and  have  less  favorable  loan  terms  until  their  new
relationships mature.
IV.B. De Novo
Although the evidence on this issue from developed countries is mixed, another
part of the external effect of consolidation could be an increase in de novo entry, that is,
new banks  that form  in  markets where mergers and  acquisitions occur (Seelig and
Critchfield, 1999; Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, and White, 2000).  Increased de novo entry
could have benefits for small borrowers.  For example, De Young, Goldberg, and White
(1999) provide evidence from the U.S. that, after controlling for various factors including
bank size, a bank's  age has a negative effect on its small business lending. Similarly,
Goldberg and White (1998) also find that bank age is inversely related to small business
lending.  In short, de novo banks in the U.S. tend to provide a higher share of loans to
small businesses than do similarly sized incumbent banks (US$5-100 million in assets).
Using a sample of banks representing seventy-eight countries, Jenkins (2000) also finds
28that newly established banks, on average, devote a larger share of their loan portfoli  to
small and micro firms than older banks.
De novo entrants are unlikely to meet a large share of a host country's  credit
needs in the near term.  They tend to have difficulty attracting deposits and finding
profitable lending opportunities.  For example, Houpt (1980) finds that de novo foreign
entrants in the U.S. were less profitable than U.S. banks acquired by foreign banks, in
part because they depended more on relatively expensive purchased funds.  Perhaps it is
these difficulties that lead de novo banks to focus on lending to small businesses.
IV C. Branches or Subsidiaries?
There are a number of organizational forms that foreign banks can adopt vvhen
entering a host country.  Goldberg (1992) notes that the most limited, but the easiest to
establish of the organizational forms, is the representative office.  These offices neither
take deposits nor make loans. Typically, they act as agents for the foreign bank and
forward payments to the home office. In general, representative offices are established to
test the possibility of further involvement in a host country.
Agencies represent a more expansive form of entry. They may make commercial
and industrial loans, but  they cannot make consumer loans. Also, they cannot accept
deposits, at least in the U.S.  They are allowed to maintain credit balances that are similar
to deposits, however, payments are rarely made from these accounts.  In the U.S. their
funding is from the parent bank  or by borrowing in  the Federal Funds or  interbank
markets.  Because  neither  the  agency  nor  the  representative office  represenr:-  full
immersion in a host country, most of the potential benefits (and risks) of foreign entry for
developing countries will likely derive from two other organizational forms - the branch
and the subsidiary.
In  the  U.S.,  branches  represent  the  most  important  organizational  form,
comprising 63.8 percent of total foreign banking assets in  1989 (Goldberg, 1992).  A
branch is an integral part of a parent bank, meaning it can draw upon the parent's capital
base, and can offer a wider range of services than agencies or representative offices.
29However, in the U.S., branches have been engaged mostly in wholesale operations. 40 By
contrast, subsidiaries are permitted to engage in a broader range of financial services than
branches, and in many countries, they have identical powers as domestic banks and thus
are regulated in the same manner.  As wholly owned subsidiary companies of parent
banks,  they  must  lend  based  on  their  own  capitalization. Unlike branches, many
subsidiaries  operating in the U.S. are oriented toward retail business.
The general thinking is that, by putting foreign banks on more equal footing with
domestic ones, subsidiaries enable banks to better draw upon their financial services
comparative advantages. 4'  Despite  these potential advantages, DeYoung and  Nolle
(1996) find that, like other types of foreign banks, subsidiaries operating in the United
States are significantly less profit-efficient than U.S. banks.  Again, however, these
results are not likely to be applicable to developing countries and, in comparison with
cross-border  lending  in  Latin  America,  which  we  describe  in  the  next  section,
subsidiaries  do appear to offer advantages.
Miller  and  Parkhe  (1998)  provide  cross-country  evidence  on  the  overseas
activities of U.S. banks that indicates that host countries can influence the organizational
form that an entrant  chooses.  They find, for example, that  in  countries that permit
universal banking,  the percentage  of  subsidiaries is higher  than  in  other  countries,
presumably because  branches  cannot  take  advantage of  all  the  profit  opportunities
available.  They also find that high host country tax rates and explicit barriers to the
creation of subsidiaries reduce the percentage of subsidiaries. 42 Furthermore, they find a
positive relation between non-financial U.S. FDI in a host country and the percentage of
subsidiaries. They argue that, as  FDI increases, subsidiaries increasingly become the
preferred organizational forms because, unlike branches, they provide the broad array of
40 Goldberg  (1992); Miller  and Parkhe  (1998).
41 The description of subsidiaries is also drawn from Goldberg (1992) and Miller and Parkhe (1998).
42  Their measure of entry barriers is based on three questions: (1) Are there geographic restrictions for
subsidiaries of foreign banks? (2) Are there restrictions as to the number of offices or activities of foreign
subsidiaries, and (3) Are foreign subsidiaries prohibited?  If the answer to any of these questions was yes,
the  dummy variable for barriers equaled one; otherwise, it equaled zero.  They answered these three
questions based  on  information  provided  by  Price  Waterhouse,  The  Economist's  Foreign  Finance
Operations, and Barth, Nolle, and Rice (1996).
30financial services demanded by larger non-financial firms.  This last result could be seen
as  supportive of  the  hypothesis  that  foreign banks  follow their  customers abroad.
However, the result does not hold for the sub-sample of developing countries, another
indication, perhaps, that foreign banks are relatively more interested in  local maLrket
opportunities in those countries.
IV.D.  Cross-border  lending
Most of the recent studies of foreign bank entry in developing countries t ave
concentrated on the lending activities of foreign banks operating within a host country's
borders (Clarke, Cull, D'Amato  and Molinari (2000); Claessens, Demirgiiu-Kunt, and
Huizinga (2000); Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000); Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000)).
According to Peek and Rosengren (2000b), these papers exclude a potentially impoitant
source of credit from banks that are operating outside the host country.  They find that
until the end of 1997 the volume of cross-border lending  provided to Argentina, Birazil,
and Mexico by foreign banking organizations exceeded the credit provided by the foreign
bank subsidiaries established in those countries. 43
In the late  1990s, they note a major shift in the composition of foreign bank
lending, as  foreign banks  have  increased their  claims  through  existing and  newly
acquired onshore banking subsidiaries rather than through cross-border loans.  Moreover.
the evidence from Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina does not indicate reluctance on the part
of foreign bank subsidiaries to expand operations when the host country is suffering From
a crisis.  Indeed, they  find that  foreign bank  penetration rose  after crises, prinmarily
reflecting acquisitions by foreign banks and the internal growth of lending by existing
foreign subsidiaries.  In comparison, they  find  that  cross-border lending was  -nore
sensitive to economic instability in the host country, typically declining after a crisis.  In
43  Their measure of cross-border  or offshore lending includes all  cross-border  claims that aie  not
attributable  to foreign subsidiaries  of banks located in BIS-reporting  countries. Therefore,  all credit
provided  by branches  located  in these  host countries  was counted  as offshore  lending.  Not  all of the studies
that Peek and Rosengren  list as neglecting  offshore  lending  ignored  credit from  branches. Clarke et al.
(2000) and Dages, Goldberg,  and Kinney (2000), both case studies  of Argentina,  included  credit from
branches.  Those  studies  did, however,  neglect  other  types  of offshore  lending.
31short, the early indications are that foreign subsidiaries  offer greater potential benefits for
developing countries than other organizational forms, but this too is an area worthy of
additional  research.  Moreover,  cross-border  lending  should  not  be  ignored  by
researchers, especially as a potential source of instability.
V. Conclusions
The past ten years have witnessed a great influx of foreign banks into several
developing countries, and that trend is likely to continue.  What benefits is foreign entry
likely to bring, and what risks does it pose?  Because most of the literature on this topic
relates to  developed countries, it is difficult to  fully answer these questions.  Initial
indications are that  many of  the  developed-country results  do not  carry over.  For
example, most studies of developed countries have found that domestic banks are more
efficient than foreign competitors and some researchers have suggested that this might
limit the scope of future cross-border consolidation. However, the evidence suggests that
foreign banks typically outperform domestic ones in developing countries. There would,
therefore, seem to be scope for efficiency-enhancing restructuring through outright sales
of domestic banks to foreign investors or through cross-border consolidation.
Some might argue that the efficiency benefits for developing countries are self-
evident, but that foreign entry poses risks in terms of the scope of service provision and
overall sector stability.  However, what evidence there is suggests that foreign banks do
more than merely follow their domestic clients abroad.  They appear to be  genuinely
interested in pursuing local lending opportunities, even more so than they have shown in
developed countries.  They may not enter all sectors forcefully, at least initially, but the
available evidence suggests that their entry will be broad enough to exert competitive
pressure on domestic banks, which should have benefits for consumers.  In the short run,
this competition could cause some domestic banks to fail, which could be destabilizing.
Foreign banks could pose another source of instability to developing countries if
they reduce their exposures to  those countries during times of crisis.  However, the
32available evidence from Latin America indicates that foreign banks were much more
likely to  extend credit than domestic banks during recent crisis periods.  There also
remain concerns about exposing developing countries to the economic fluctuations  c  :. the
home countries of foreign banks, or the fluctuations of other developing countries where
these banks operate.  These contagion effects have not yet been well researched, but it
seems likely that having foreign entrants from a diversified group of countries could
minimize these risks.
The incipient empirical evidence on the impact of foreign entry on access to credit
by small businesses suggests that while foreign banks tend to be large, and large banks
devote smaller shares of their portfolios to small businesses than other banks, there are
some signs that technological changes are enabling large foreign banks  to serve this
sector. Undoubtedly, this is an area that requires further research.
As to how the mode of foreign bank entry affects hosts countries, recent studies
appear to indicate that subsidiaries allow foreign banks to  provide a  wider range of
activities and bring greater stability in lending to host countries. However, the empirical
evidence on this matter is very limited and further research is warranted to assist' host
countries in deciding which mode of entry they should promote.
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